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Abstract 
This paper examines how auditors respond to accounting restatements using Japanese 
audit input data. We find that audit fees, the number of Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA) licensed staff, and the number of signing partners are higher for firms in the 
restatement year than the year prior to the restatement. Our results also show that the 
increase in audit fees and the higher numbers of CPA licensed staff and signing partners 
persists after the restatement year. Overall, our findings suggest that audit firms charge 
higher fees and assign more experienced staff in response to accounting restatements, 
implying that we can attribute part of the increased audit fees to increased efforts, not 
the risk premium alone. We believe that ours is the first study to document auditors 
increase the numbers of licensed staff and signing partners in response to their own 
responsibilities (i.e., a restatement could result from a previously failed audit). 
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Data Availability The data used in this paper are from publicly available sources as 
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1 Introduction 
 
In this paper, we examine how auditors allocate audit inputs in response to accounting 
restatements using data obtained from firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
Currently, firms listed on the TSE are required to disclose in their audited annual filings 
the names of the signing partners,1 and the composition of the engaging audit team (e.g., 
the numbers of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed and nonlicensed staff) along 
with the amount of fees paid for audit and nonaudit services. This unique degree of 
disclosure enables us to measure directly the use of audit inputs by auditors2 for each 
audit engagement. 
A number of prior studies have discussed the relation between audit inputs and 
restatements (Whisenant et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 2004; Lobo and Zhao 2013; Hribar 
et al. 2014). For instance, Whisenant et al. (2003) suggest that audit fees represent the 
level of service and effort provided by the auditor. Therefore, a higher level of effort, 
as reflected by a higher audit fee, may reduce the likelihood of restatement. Kinney et 
al. (2004) identify a positive association between audit fees and restatement and suggest 
that this may “… reflect audit firm identification and pricing of ex ante misstatement 
risk or added audit effort for risky contexts.” 
However, Kinney et al. (2004) only mention but do not test this assumption. 
However, follow-up studies by Lobo and Zhao (2013) and Hribar et al. (2014) that 
examine the association between audit effort and restatement obtain somewhat mixed 
results. For example, Lobo and Zhao (2013) identify a negative association between 
audit effort (as measured by audit fees) and subsequent restatement, whereas Hribar et 
al. (2014) conclude a positive association between current-year audit effort (again 
measured by audit fees) and the probability of restatement. 
For the most part, the pricing of audit fees draws on audit costs (i.e., the quantity and 
quality of audit staff) and audit profits (including risk premiums). Simunic (1980) first 
develops a model to explain audit fees, which Pratt and Stice (1994) later use to confirm 
that a risk premium compensates auditors for the taking of risks over and above audit 
profits. However, given the limited data availability in the US (e.g., the lack of audit 
effort data), it is difficult for studies there to identify clearly the relation between risk 
premiums and costs using only audit fee data. 
Consequently, extant studies have mostly undertaken extensive discussion on the 
limitations of audit fee pricing research in that effort data is publicly unavailable, and 
that they are then obliged to infer audit effort or the risk premium by relying only on 
                                                      
1 The CPA Act of Japan requires at least one signing partner for assurance services (CPA Act 34-10-4 and 
CPA Act 34-10-5). However, in practice, audit firms usually assign two or more signing partners to each 
audit engagement. 
2 We use the terms auditor and audit firm interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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audit fee data (Simunic and Stein 1996; Houston et al. 1999; Johnstone and Bedard 
2001). By having audit input data available that contain the numbers of audit staff for 
each audit engagement, our analysis should provide direct evidence of audit effort 
regarding accounting restatement. 
In this study, we examine the consequences of accounting restatements (i.e., an 
external event as well as a distinct risk indicator) in terms of the decisions of auditors 
in allocating audit inputs. We hypothesize and find that auditors increase audit inputs 
(i.e., audit fees and the numbers of licensed staff and signing partners) allocated to the 
engaging audit team for the restatement year. The evidence also indicates that the 
increased audit inputs persist for at least a year following the restatement. To some 
extent, our findings also imply that increased audit fees reflect increased audit costs in 
the case of a restatement. Taken together, the setting in this study provides evidence 
indicating that increased efforts accompany the increased audit fees, not merely the risk 
premium alone. 
To confirm the robustness of our evidence, we also examine the effect of auditor 
switching and conclude that our main findings remain unchanged. We also use 
misstatements as a placebo test. The results here suggest that the auditors are not aware 
of the occurrence of misstatement until the client firms restate their financial statements. 
We also perform several other placebo tests and the results there support those in the 
main analysis. 
Using data on audit inputs, we contribute to the literature in the following ways. To 
start, while the existing literature discusses the relation between audit effort (as proxied 
by audit fees) and the likelihood of subsequent restatement, it does not measure audit 
inputs directly (Lobo and Zhao 2013; Hribar et al. 2014). However, using audit input 
data (audit staff quantity and quality along with audit fees) the results we provide prove 
that we can attribute a certain portion of the increased audit fees for restatement to 
increased efforts, not the risk premium alone. In addition, our results reveal the actual 
response of auditors to the restatement event in terms of audit input allocation, rather 
than the mere association between audit effort and the likelihood of future restatement. 
Our findings also confirm the importance of auditor experience and knowledge to 
audit quality. Hossain et al. (2017) demonstrate that the number of licensed auditors 
involves a positive association with audit quality (but signing partners are left untested) 
when the client firms are in financial distress. For our part, we show that auditors 
increase the numbers of licensed staff and signing partners in response to their own 
responsibilities (i.e., a restatement could result from a previously failed audit). This 
implies that experienced audit staff (i.e., licensed staff and signing partners) provide 
quality to the audit, and we clearly identify the role signing partners play in delivering 
audit quality. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the institutional 
background of the audit market in Japan and develops the working hypotheses. Section 
3 provides the research design and Section 4 discusses the main results and findings 
and elaborates upon their implications. Section 5 provides additional analyses of the 
robustness and placebo tests. The paper concludes in Section 6. 
 
 
2 Institutional background and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Audit fees, risk, and restatements 
 
The related literature establishes a positive association between audit fees and risk for 
which Hay et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive review. Some of these studies argue 
that restatement is strong evidence of the financial reporting failure that often results in 
management turnover (Srinivasan 2005; Desai et al. 2006) and negative market 
reactions (Palmrose et al. 2004). There are also studies that find audit fees are higher 
for firms that disclose material internal control weaknesses, which also often lead to 
financial restatements (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008). 
Other studies find that restatement may involve a lower level of effort, as reflected 
in audit fees that eventually lead to financial reporting failure (Whisenant et al. 2003; 
Kinney et al. 2004). Some follow-up studies attempt to distinguish audit efforts from 
audit fees and examine the association between audit efforts and restatement. However, 
the reported evidence is mixed and they continue to use audit fees to infer audit effort 
(Blankley et al. 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013; Hribar et al. 2014). 
While prior studies have provided extensive evidence to suggest that audit fees could 
be higher for firms that issue restatements, which in turn can result in higher 
management turnover, data limitations have prevented them from identifying the 
reasons for the increased audit fees in the first instance. This is important because unless 
the data for audit effort and audit fees are jointly available, identifying the relationship 
between risk and audit effort will be difficult (Houston et al. 1999; Johnstone and 
Bedard 2001). Consequently, we examine the relationship between audit inputs and 
restatements by exploiting the allocation of audit inputs using Japanese data. The 
following section provides the institutional background and the characteristics of the 
data used. 
 
2.2 Audit fee pricing and disclosures in Japan 
 
Audit fees in Japan were not disclosed in annual securities filings by firms (yukashoken 
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hokokusho) until 2004. Before 2004, the Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (JICPA) priced audit fees using a so-called Standard Audit Fee Schedule 
(hyojun kansa hyoshu). Under the Standard Fee Schedule, audit firms charged their 
client firms audit fees based on a combination of a fixed rate multiplied by the number 
of audit staff and the number of days auditors spent auditing the firm.3 In October 2003, 
the JICPA released new audit fee pricing guidelines4 and amended audit fee pricing to 
the so-called “time charge” method. The new time charge audit fee pricing guidelines 
require auditors to assess the audit risks and price these risks into audit fees. 
Under the new time charge guidelines in place since March 2004, the sum of the 
required profits of the audit firms plus the direct and indirect audit costs determine the 
audit fees. Audit firms calculate direct audit costs using the charge rate5 of auditors 
multiplied by the time needed for the audit, while the indirect audit costs are mostly 
fixed costs, such as insurance fees. Therefore, the time needed for auditing plays the 
primary important role in pricing audit fees. The JICPA fee guidelines clearly state that 
the estimation of the time needed for auditing should consider client size, complexity, 
and audit risk. Therefore, we expect that the pricing of audit fees involve a direct 
association with the time estimated for auditing.6 
It was not until 2017 that the names of engagement partners appeared on the annual 
filings of listed firms in the US.7 In contrast, the audit reports of Japanese firms have 
disclosed the names of engagement partners for several decades. For this reason, 
partners’ reputations have long been at stake in Japan. Using the 2006 Kanebo 
accounting scandal, Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) show that auditor reputation plays 
an important role in maintaining audit quality in Japan. Moreover, administrative 
sanctions by the Japanese government on accounting fraud usually include revealing 
                                                      
3 According to the Standard Fee Schedule set by the JICPA, audit fees consist of basic fees and working 
fees. The basic fees are JPY9.95 million for firms listed in the 1st Section of the TSE, JPY6.85 million 
for firms listed in the 2nd section, and JPY5.75 million for all other firms. Working fees are JPY2.48 
million per leading auditor. If auditors spend more than 25 days auditing a firm, the additional working 
fees are JPY0.089 million per day multiplied by the number of leading and supporting auditors. 
4  For the current JICPA audit fee pricing guidelines, see 
http://www.hp.jicpa.or.jp/specialized_field/pdf/member/01122-003578.pdf (in Japanese). 
5 Each auditor has their own charge rate according to their rank (e.g., partner, manager, senior, and junior) 
in the audit firm. 
6  Since the establishment of the time charge method in 2004, several studies (e.g., Yazawa 2009; 
Fukukawa 2011; Yazawa 2012) in Japan, including those by the JICPA itself, have attempted to examine 
how audit fees are determined under the new pricing scheme. The JICPA has also conducted several 
studies that attempt to reveal how auditors estimate audit time under the time charge method. The study 
reports and a follow-up revision (kansajikan no mistumori ni kansuru kenkyu hokoku) were released in 
September 2006 and June 2008, respectively. For details, see 
http://www.hp.jicpa.or.jp/specialized_field/main/18_12.html (in Japanese). 
7 US Securities and Exchange Commission (Release No. 34-77787; File No. PCAOB-2016-01), “Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board; Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rules to Require 
Disclosure of Certain Audit Participants on a New PCAOB Form and Related Amendments to Auditing 
Standards,” May 9, 2016. (https://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2016/34-77787.pdf) 
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the names of individual signing auditors. It is then very clear that even the Japanese 
public will know the role that individual signing auditors play in any accounting scandal. 
As an example, the regulating authorities publicly disclosed the names of seven signing 
partners sanctioned by the Japanese government for their role in a recent Toshiba 
accounting scandal.8 
 
2.3 Regulation and disclosure of accounting restatements in Japan 
 
In general, the regulations on accounting restatements in Japan are very similar to those 
in the US. Since the US Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002 (known as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, hereafter, SOX Act) became effective, 
Japan has modeled its own J-SOX after the US SOX Act, and included it in the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan, effective April 2008. 
The disclosure-related regulations required by the Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Act of Japan are as follows. First, all listed firms in Japan are required to file 
accounting restatements if any material errors are found in the annual report (Article 
No. 24-2, Clause 1), for which the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan 
contains provisions for civil liability (Article No. 24-4) and criminal responsibility 
(Article No. 197, Clause 1). In addition, there is a requirement for auditing by external 
auditors of the financial statements prepared by listed firms (Article No. 193-2, Clause 
1). If any damages arise from false statements resulting from auditor negligence, the 
external auditors are liable for compensation (Article No. 22, Article 24-4). 
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
 
Existing studies (e.g., Whisenant et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 2004; Blankley et al. 
2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013; Hribar et al. 2014) have provided abundant argument and 
evidence on the positive relation between audit fees/effort and subsequent restatement. 
In addition, Hossain et al. (2017) suggest that while there is a positive association 
between audit fees and audit staff, only experienced staff are associated with audit 
quality. Therefore, it is very likely that auditors may charge restatement firms higher 
audit fees and assign staff that are more experienced to these firms. The following are 
our hypotheses for this analysis: 
 
H1: Compared with the year prior to restatement, audit firms charge higher audit fees 
in the restatement year. 
                                                      
8 Press release for sanctions on the signing partners in the recent Toshiba scandal can be found at the 
following URL: https://www.fsa.go.jp/news/27/sonota/20151222-4.html. 
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H2: Compared with the year prior to restatement, audit firms allocate more experienced 
audit staff in the restatement year. 
 
 
3 Research method 
 
3.1 Model and variables 
 
Using studies (e.g., Gul 2006; Srinidhi and Gul 2007; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; 
Dechow et al. 2011; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013), we develop 
the following regression model to examine the relation between audit inputs and 
restatements (for simplicity, we omit the firm and year subscripts): 
 
Audit Inputs (Audit Fees, Staff, License Staff, Signing Partner) 
= 0 + 1PreRS + 2PostRS + 3LnAssets + 4Leverage 
+ 5ROA + 6OverseaSales + 7LnSeg + 8LnSub 
+ 9DailyReturn + 10FirmAge + 11BigN + 12JSOX 
+ Fixed-Industry +          (1) 
 
In this regression, and specifying the restatement year as the reference group, we 
compare: (a) the differences between the year prior to the restatement year and the 
restatement year, and (b) the differences between the restatement year and the year 
following the restatement year. Specifically, we regress the observations for the year 
prior to the restatement, the observations for the restatement year, and the year after the 
restatement year, where the benchmark year for the estimation regression is the 
restatement year. 
The variable PreRS is the year prior to the restatement year and is a dummy variable 
set equal to one for the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year when the firm files a 
restatement and zero otherwise. Similarly, PostRS is the year after the restatement year 
and is a dummy variable set equal to one for the fiscal year after the restatement year 
and zero otherwise. 
This estimation regression enables us to reveal directly the association between the 
dependent variables and the variables of interest (i.e., PreRS and PostRS). The 
dependent variables are Audit Inputs. We use four different metrics (audit fees, number 
of staff, licensed staff, and signing partners) as measures of audit inputs. We measure 
the audit fees in millions of JPY while the remaining three measures are the numbers 
of persons. All dependent variables are in natural logarithms. We assume a logarithmic 
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transformation for the following reasons. First, a log–linear relation yields a more 
normally distributed error term. Second, as the size of the client firms varies, it is easier 
to interpret the economic significance of the coefficients because we obtain the 
percentage change on the log-transformed dependent variable. 
The control variables are consistent with those in prior studies (e.g., Gul 2006; 
Srinidhi and Gul 2007; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Dechow et al. 2011; Lobo and Zhao 
2013). We include the following in the model: LnAssets, Leverage, ROA, OverseasSales, 
LnSub, LnSeg, DailyRET, FirmAge, and BigN. These control variables control for size, 
complexity, risk, and related factors in the regression. LNAST, which is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, controls for size. To control for complexity, we use LnSub (the 
number of consolidated subsidiary firms), LnSeg (the number of business segments), 
and OverseasSales (overseas sales over total sales). Overall, we expect firms that have 
more consolidated subsidiary firms, more segments, and overseas sales to all increase 
the workload for auditors. 
To control for audit risk, we use Leverage (total liabilities over total assets) and ROA 
(net income over total assets). DailyRET is the firm-level standard deviation of daily 
stock returns. FirmAge is the natural logarithm of firm age (measured as the financial 
statement reporting date of the corresponding fiscal year minus the firm’s date of 
establishment). BigN is an indicator variable set equal to one if a Big N audit firm audits 
a firm. Finally, we include JSOX, an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditing 
of the annual filings of the firms is in accordance with JSOX requirements. This helps 
control for any potential variation pre- and post-JSOX.9 
Lastly, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles to minimize 
the effect of extreme values. We also include industry fixed effects to account for 
systematic variations in the dependent variable across industries and cluster the 
standard errors at the firm level. 
 
 
3.2 Data sources and sample selection 
 
We obtain our data from publicly available sources. We retrieve the restatement data 
from the restatement filings documented in the EDINET10 (Electronic Disclosure for 
Investors’ NETwork), the Japanese equivalent to the EDGAR (Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) system in the US. We retrieve 13,764 restatement 
filings from the EDINET for the period 2005 to 2015 corresponding to the availability 
of the audit input data. Among the 13,764 filings, we manually identify the restatements 
                                                      
9 All annual filings dated March 31, 2009 and later are prepared in accordance with JSOX. 
10 Operated by the Financial Services Agency of the Government of Japan. 
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of net income and obtain 757 income restatement filings. From these 757 filings, we 
remove 157 duplicate filings and obtain 640 misstatements11  and 205 restatement 
events. We code the misstatement and restatement events into the corresponding fiscal 
years. 
Given compulsory disclosure of the names of the signing partners and the numbers 
of people in the audit team in the annual filings, we manually collected the data for 
audit firms, audit fees, and the composition of engaging audit team by searching for 
audit team information in the pdf files of the annual filings of listed firms in Japan. The 
annual filings are also from the EDINET. We commence our sample period in 2005, the 
year when audit staff information became publicly available.12 
Listed firms in Japan are required to disclose in their annual filings the names of the 
signing partners and the composition of the engagement audit team. However, for 
convenience and given that there is no official format to follow, most firms simply 
disclose the number of staff with CPA licenses and the other staff in the engagement 
team. Some firms will further disclose the number of CPA candidates (kaikeishiho, 
regarded as junior CPAs in Hossain et al. 2017)13 and the numbers of staff that have 
passed the CPA exam (but not yet accumulated sufficient experience to receive a CPA 
license) in the audit team. 
However, some firms may include these CPA candidates and CPA exam passers as 
other nonlicensed staff. In this analysis, we categorize the composition of the audit team 
into licensed and nonlicensed staff because the number of licensed staff is the most 
consistent data available and the disclosure will never list a person without a CPA 
license as licensed staff. As a result, our data contains the numbers of signing partners, 
licensed staff and other staff (those without an official CPA license). 
Finally, we obtain financial data from the Nikkei NEEDS-FinancialQuest database.14 
From 2005 to 2015, we obtain 27,971 observations for nonfinancial firms listed on the 
first and second Sections of the TSE. We begin our sample selection process with these 
27,971 observations. Table 1 summarizes the process. We first exclude 5,025 
                                                      
11 Some files contain duplicate information. For example, if a firm restates its net income in 2015 for an 
accounting mistake in 2012, this affects the net income in 2012 and 2013. Firms are required to submit 
restatement filings for each fiscal year from 2012 to 2015 to the regulatory authorities (i.e., four files for 
the two years’ of restatements will be retrieved from the EDINET). 
12 Audit staff information became available in the annual reports from March 31, 2005 onwards. 
13 Before January 1, 2006, those passing the CPA exam in Japan gained the status of CPA candidate 
(kaikeishiho). After three years of practical training, CPA candidates were eligible for the final exam, and 
after passing, granted a CPA license. However, from January 1, 2006, there was no granting of CPA 
candidate status. Instead, those passing the CPA exam are “people who have passed the CPA exam,” and 
after two years of practical training, granted a CPA license. For more details about the CPA exam system 
in Japan, see Ch. 4 of the 2004 annual reports of the Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight 
Board, Japan (http://www.fsa.go.jp/cpaaob/shinsakai/reports/16/honpen/). 
14 Skinner (2008), Kato et al. (2009) and Kato et al. (2017) employ the same data source. 
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observations for those with missing audit fee or staff data.15 We then delete a further 
5,032 observations with missing values for any of the control variables. This yields a 
sample of 17,914 observations (97 restatement observations and 17,817 other 
observations). 
For the 97 restatement observations, we require that data are available for three 
consecutive years, i.e., the year prior to the restatement year (PreRS), the restatement 
year, and the year after the restatement year (PostRS). We impose this requirement, 
which excludes 10 observations, to ensure data consistency so that we can obtain 
comparable results. For the remaining 87 observations, we check if there is any 
overlapping among variables (i.e., PreRS being PostRS for other restatements because 
of multiple restatement filings). Where there is an overlap, we retain the first 
restatement observation and delete the subsequent observations to eliminate the 
potential effects from overlapping years. Using this process, we delete 27 overlapping 
observations, leaving a final sample of 60 restatement observations. 
Because we compare the differences between the year prior to the restatement year 
(PreRS = 1), the restatement year (PreRS = 0 and PostRS = 0), and the year after the 
restatement year (PostRS = 1), there are 180 total observations, comprising 60 
observations for the year prior to the restatement, 60 for the restatement year, and 60 
for the year after restatement. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. 
 
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 Main results 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the regression model (1). Because our main 
concern is to identify how auditors respond to restatements, we use the restatement year 
as the benchmark to compare any differences between the prerestatement, restatement, 
and the postrestatement years. The variable PreRS captures the differences between the 
prerestatement and restatement year. As shown in Table 3, PreRS is negatively and 
significantly associated with LnAFee, LnLiStaff, and LnPartners. When the dependent 
variable is LnAFee, the estimated coefficient for PreRS is –0.1899 (significant at the 
1% level), indicating that audit fees in the year prior to restatement are 17.3%16 lower 
                                                      
15 The Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan only requires firms to disclose audit staff-related 
information in an easily comprehensible way (Cabinet Office Ordinance on the Disclosure of Corporate 
Affair, Cabinet Office Ordinance No. 34 of March 31, 2005). Without a uniform disclosure format, the 
audit staff disclosures in the annual reports vary from the exact numbers of auditing staff to “the firm is 
audited by multiple staff.” 
16 The amount of audit fees (in millions of JPY) are in natural logarithms in the regression. Therefore, 
the coefficient for PreRS –0.1899 indicates that the audit fees in the year prior to the restatement represent 
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than in the restatement year. 
When the dependent variable is set to LnLiStaff, the coefficient for PreRS is –0.1558 
(significant at the 5% level), revealing that the number of licensed staff in the engaging 
audit team is 14.4%17 lower in the year prior to the restatement year. Furthermore, we 
find that when setting LnPartners as the dependent variable, the coefficient for PreRS 
is –0.0502 (significant at the 10% level), suggesting that audit firms may assign more 
signing partners to the engaging audit teams in the restatement year. Lastly, when the 
dependent variable is LnStaff the coefficient for PreRS is –0.0362 but is not statistically 
significant, indicating that audit firms do not increase the number of nonlicensed staff 
for restatements. 
Together, the results reported in Table 3 suggest that audit firms charge higher audit 
fees and assign more experienced staff (licensed staff and signing partners) to the 
engaging audit team in the restatement year. This suggests that we could attribute at 
least part of the increased audit fee to increased audit effort because more experienced 
audit staff (licensed staff and signing partners) are being allocated to the restatement 
assignment. The results in Table 3 are also consistent with Hossain et al. (2017) who 
find that only licensed staff are associated with audit quality. While Hossain et al. 
(2017) argue that the number of signing partners is a noisy measure (left untested), our 
results indicate that signing partners also play a role in delivering quality audits. 
In contrast, another variable of interest, PostRS, is not significantly associated with 
any of the dependent variables. This suggests that audit firms do not change the fees 
they charge for the restating firms after the restatement year. The results also indicate 
that the numbers of licensed staff and signing partners after the restatement year are 
unchanged. Taken together, these results suggest that increases in audit fees and the 
number of licensed staff and signing partners in the restatement year persist for at least 
one year in subsequent years.18 
 
4.2 Controlling for audit staff 
 
To test the robustness of the main results, we estimate the association between audit 
fees and the variables of interest while controlling for the direct audit staff variables. 
Table 4 reports the results. These are consistent with the main results: auditors charge 
                                                      
82.7% of the audit fees in the restatement year, i.e., 17.3% (exp[–0.1899]). 
17 The coefficient for PreRS is –0.1558, thus exp(–0.1558) = 0.856 or 85.6%, indicating an increase of 
14.4% from the year prior to the restatement year. 
18 Because LnStaff, LnLiStaff, and LnPartner are the numbers of audit staff (discrete values), we re-
estimate the model using ordered logistic regression. The results we obtain are similar to these with 
ordinary least squares. We find that audit firms are more likely to allocate more licensed staff and signing 
partners in the restatement year and that the increased numbers of audit staff persist at least for a year in 
the postrestatement years. 
11 
 
firms lower audit fees in the year prior to the restatement year (the coefficient for PreRS 
is –0.1301, indicating a 12% increase in audit fees, significant at the 5% level). They 
also show that the number of licensed staff is also positively associated with audit fees, 
suggesting that increased audit efforts contribute to increased audit fees, especially in 
the form of increased efforts by licensed staff. 
 
4.3 Accounting for audit firm switching 
 
We perform further analysis to account for the effects of audit firm switching. To check 
the robustness of the main results, we delete firms that switch audit firms during the 
restatement period. If a firm switches audit firms during the year before a restatement, 
the restatement year, or the year after the restatement, we delete this firm from the 
sample. We delete three observations using this process. 
We perform two sets of auditor switch analyses. The first analysis is with the 
nonswitching sample. Panel A in Table 5 reports the regression results when all auditor 
switch observations are deleted (11 firms, and thus 33 observations, are deleted from 
the sample). We obtain results similar to those for the main analysis. The coefficients 
for PreRS for audit fees and licensed staff are –0.1328 and –0.1207, respectively (both 
significant at the 5% level). Compared with the results reported in Table 3, we find the 
magnitude of the audit fee increase is significantly smaller for firms that did not switch 
(–0.1657 in Table 3, –0.1328 in Table 5). We obtain similar significant results for 
licensed staff (–0.1444 in Table 3, –0.1207 in Table 5). 
The second switch analysis employs the same sample after deleting switching 
between Big N and non-Big N audit firms. Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression 
results when switches between Big N and non-Big N audit firms are deleted (5 firms, 
and thus 15 observations, are deleted from the sample). The results reported in Panel B 
of Table 5 are identical to the results reported in Table 3, i.e., the coefficients for PreRS 
are negatively and significantly associated with LnAFee, LnLiStaff, and LnPartner and 
insignificantly associated with LnStaff. The above results, taken together, suggest that 
our results are robust. 
 
5. Additional robustness testing 
 
5.1 Using the misstatement sample as a placebo test 
 
In this section, we discuss the analyses using the misstatement sample. As Kinney et al. 
(2004) mention that the positive association between audit fee and restatement they 
obtain in their study may “… reflect audit firm identification and pricing of ex ante 
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misstatement risk or added audit effort for risky contexts,” we use the following 
regression model to estimate the relation between audit inputs and misstatements. 
 
Audit Inputs (Audit Fee, Staff, License Staff, Signing Partner) 
= 0 + 1PreMS + 2PostMS + 3LnAssets + 4Leverage 
+ 5ROA + 6OverseaSales + 7LnSeg + 8LnSub 
+ 9DailyReturn + 10FirmAge + 11BigN + 12JSOX 
+ Fixed-Industry +       (2) 
 
This model is similar to regression model (1) where we estimate the relation between 
audit inputs and restatement. We replace PreRS and PostRS with PreMS and PostMS, 
respectively. Here, PreMS is an indicator variable set equal to one if the fiscal year is 
one year prior to the misstatement and zero otherwise, and PostMS is set equal to one 
if the fiscal year is one year after the misstatement and zero otherwise. 
The sample selection process is similar to that for our misstatement analysis. After 
deleting variables with missing values during the 2005–2015 fiscal years, we begin our 
selection process with 285 misstatement observations. We require that the misstatement 
observations have data available for three consecutive years, i.e., the year prior to the 
misstatement year (i.e., PreMS = 1), the misstatement year (i.e., PreMS = 0 and PostMS 
= 0), and the year after the misstatement year (i.e., the PostMS = 1). This requirement 
leaves us with 72 misstatement observations. 
We further check if there is any overlapping among variables (e.g., PreMS being 
PostMS for other misstatement observations). Unlike restatements, misstatements are 
ex post events not defined until the filing of a restatement. Therefore, we could identify 
some misstatements and restatements in the same fiscal year. With such a short time lag 
between misstatement and restatement, it would be difficult to identify separately the 
effects of misstatements from those of restatements. We, therefore, delete a further 63 
misstatement observations with restatements within two fiscal years of a misstatement 
year. As a result, our final sample consists of nine misstatement observations with data 
available for three consecutive fiscal years (the year prior to a misstatement, the 
misstatement year, and the year after the misstatement year) without overlap with 
another misstatement or restatement.19 
Table 6 summarizes the results for the misstatements. As shown, the estimated 
coefficients for PreMS across all regressions are negative, but none of the coefficients 
for PreMS nor PostMS are statistically significant. These results imply that audit firms 
                                                      
19 As in our treatments of restatements, we compare: (a) the differences between the year prior to a 
misstatement and the misstatement year, and (b) the misstatement year and the year after a misstatement. 
Therefore, there will be 27 observations in the regression analysis (i.e., nine each for the year prior to the 
misstatement, the misstatement year, and the year after restatement). 
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might not be aware of any ex ante misstatement risk until the actual restatement. 
 
5.2 Additional placebo tests 
 
5.2.1 Matched nonrestatement sample 
 
We first replicate our main analysis using a matched nonrestatement firm sample to 
check the sensitivity of our results. For the matching criteria, we match nonrestatement 
firms with similar amounts of assets to our sample of restatement firms. We require that 
matched nonrestatement firms be in the same industry and have the same fiscal year as 
the restatement and misstatement firms. As a result, the matched nonrestatement firms 
have no significant differences in assets with the restatement firms.20 The empirical 
treatments for the placebo tests are identical to those in the main analysis. 
Panels A and B in Table 7 summarize the results for the restatements with matched 
nonrestatement firms. As in the main analysis, we regress the observations for matched 
nonrestatement firms along with the observations in the year prior to the restatement 
year and the year after the restatement year. Therefore, there will be 180 observations 
in the regression analysis for restatements (i.e., 60 observations each for the year prior 
to the restatement, the restatement year, and the year after a restatement). 
Panel A reports the results of the placebo test based on Table 3 using matched 
nonrestatements. As expected, there is no significant association between PreRS (nor 
PostRS) and audit inputs (i.e., audit fees, staff, licensed staff, and signing partners). 
Panel B reports the results for the placebo test using matched nonrestatement sample 
while controlling for audit labor variables based on Table 4. Again, we find no 
significant association between audit fees and PreRS (and PostRS). 
 
5.2.2 Matched nonmisstatement sample 
 
We also replicate the analysis for Table 6 with the matched nonmisstatement firms 
sample as placebo tests. The results (not shown) are consistent with those in Table 6 in 
that there is no statistically significant association between audit input and misstatement. 
 
5.3 Instrumental variable regression 
 
Lastly, we perform instrumental variable regression as a further robustness test and 
                                                      
20 We perform a t test to check the differences in the amount of assets between the matched firms and our 
sample firms, and find no significant difference for either restatement sample (t = 0.4513 for the 
restatement sample). 
14 
 
obtain similar results to our findings in Table 4. We use the industry mean numbers of 
staff, licensed staff, and signing auditors as instruments to capture audit fee pricing. The 
results (not shown) indicate that audit fees increase in the restatement year and persist 
in the postrestatement year. We also conduct a placebo test for this instrumental variable 
regression using a sample of asset-matched nonrestatement firms and obtain results that 
support the main analysis. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
As argued in the literature, prior studies have relied solely on audit fees to infer audit 
risks and efforts. Our study provides a more reliable foundation by using direct audit 
input data. In our study, we examine the allocation of audit inputs the year prior to 
restatement, the year of restatement, and the year after restatement in an effort to 
identify how auditors respond to accounting restatements. We find that audit fees, the 
number of CPA licensed staff, and the number of signing partners increases in the 
restatement year. We further find that these increases in audit inputs persist after 
restatement. 
Overall, the evidence we provide suggests that compared with the year prior to 
restatement, auditors charge higher audit fees and allocate more experienced staff to 
firms that restate their financial statements, and do not reduce either fees or audit staff 
for at least a year after the accounting restatement. Our results further reveal that we 
can attribute a certain portion of the increased audit fees to the higher number of audit 
staff assigned to the engagement for accounting restatement, not just the risk premium 
alone. We also obtain results supporting our main analysis using placebo tests. 
We contribute to the literature by showing increased efforts contribute to a certain 
portion of increased audit fees for restatement, not only the risk premium. While most 
prior studies infer the association between prior audit efforts and the subsequent 
likelihood of restatement, we show that auditors respond to the restatement event by 
increasing the provision of experienced audit staff to the engaging audit team. The 
results presented in this paper also confirm the importance of auditor knowledge in that 
it is experienced audit staff (i.e., licensed staff and signing partners) that provide quality 
to the audit. 
Of course, our analysis involves some limitations. First, we have clearly sacrificed 
sample size to obtain a clean restatement sample. Second, we are also aware that the 
number of people assigned to the engaging audit team cannot completely be a proxy for 
the audit efforts committed to the engagement. Finally, the data we use are only from 
Japanese firms. While Japan is certainly a major financial market, it does not imply that 
our findings are generalizable to other institutional settings. 
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As fruitful directions for future research, we argue that we could usefully exploit 
what happens immediately before the discovery of misstatement. We find no signs to 
suggest that auditors are aware of the occurrence of misstatement until the restatement 
announcement. A future study could consider this from a managerial perspective and 
search for possible ways of detecting misstatements in advance. 
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Appendix - Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
LnAFee Audit fee, in natural logarithms; 
LnStaff Numbers of auditing staff, in natural logarithms; 
LnLiStaff Numbers of staff with a CPA license, in natural logarithms;  
LnPartner Numbers of signing partners, in natural logarithms;  
PreRS An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the fiscal year is one year 
prior to restatement year, 0 otherwise;   
PostRS An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the fiscal year is one year 
after restatement year, 0 otherwise; 
PreMS An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the fiscal year is one year 
prior to misstatement year, 0 otherwise; 
PostMS An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the fiscal year is one year 
after restatement year, 0 otherwise; 
LnAsset Natural logarithm of total assets; 
Leverage Total liabilities over total assets; 
ROA Net income over lagged total assets; 
OverseaSales Overseas sales over total sales; 
LnSeg Natural logarithm of the number of operating segments plus 1; 
LnSub Natural logarithm of the number of subsidiary companies plus 1; 
DailyReturn Firm-level standard deviation of daily stock returns;  
FirmAge Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of financial statement 
reporting date minus firm establishment date; 
BigN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big N 
auditor, 0 otherwise; 
JSOX An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s annual report is 
filed in accordance with JSOX requirements, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1 Sample selection  
Panel A   
No. of listed firms in TSE  27,971
  Less 5,025 observations for missing fee or staff data  22,946
  Less 5,032 observations for any missing control variables data  17,914
97 restatement / 17,817 non-restatement
  
Panel B  
No. of Restatement   97
  Less 10 observations for missing data in either PreRS and PostRS  87
  Less 27 observation for overlapping restatement periods  60
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics (N=180 (60 * 3)) 
Variables  Mean S.D. 25% 50% 75%
       
LnAFee  3.8635 0.8913 3.2189 3.6889 4.2485
LnStaff  2.1340 0.7576 1.6094 2.1972 2.6391
LnLiStaff  1.9904 0.6340 1.6094 1.9459 2.3979
LnPartner  0.8206 0.2561 0.6931 0.6931 1.0986
LNAsset  10.9819 1.7352 9.8856 10.8113 11.8478
Leverage  0.6037 0.1946 0.4511 0.5973 0.7575
ROA  -0.0104 0.1556 -0.0050 0.0144 0.0409
OverseaSales  0.1030 0.1902 0.0000 0.0000 0.1375
LNSeg  1.6292 0.8188 1.7918 1.9459 2.0794
LNSub  2.5406 1.2179 1.6094 2.3979 2.9957
DailyReturn  2.8343 1.4758 1.8033 2.3966 3.4473
FirmAge  50.3815 28.6102 32.1424 50.898 67.6893
BigN  0.7000 0.4595 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
JSOX  0.7444 0.4374 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
Raw Variables   
AuditFee  80.8891 138.0696 25 40 70
Staff  11.0444 8.6022 5 9 14
LiStaff  8.0833 7.0970 4 6 10
SigningPartner  2.3444 0.5821 2 2 3
   
Audit fee, non-audit fee and assets are in million Japanese Yen before natural logarithm. Audit manpower 
(signing partners, licensed staff, and non-licensed staff) are number of persons before natural logarithm. See 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 – Results for Restatement 
 
  LnAFee LnStaff LnLiStaff LnPartner
      
PreRS  -0.1657***
(-3.44) 
-0.0362 
(-0.53) 
-0.1444** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0502* 
(-1.76) 
PostRS  -0.0683 
(-1.37) 
-0.0175 
(-0.24) 
-0.0916 
(-1.57) 
0.0467 
(1.58) 
LNAsset  0.3007***
(5.41) 
0.1422** 
(2.30) 
0.1926*** 
(3.29) 
0.0629**
(2.03) 
Leverage  0.3817 
(1.48) 
0.2916 
(0.86) 
0.348 
(1.11) 
0.0049 
(0.03) 
ROA  -0.0703 
(-0.25) 
0.1176 
(0.37) 
0.2398 
(0.99) 
-0.3959**
(-2.36) 
OverseaSales  0.041 
(0.14) 
0.8242* 
(1.85) 
-0.2114 
(-0.48) 
0.0045 
(0.02) 
LNSeg  -0.1094* 
(-1.76) 
-0.1108* 
(-1.70) 
0.0215 
(0.32) 
0.0282 
(0.82) 
LNSub  0.2409***
(3.34) 
0.0305 
(0.34) 
-0.0024 
(-0.03) 
-0.0505 
(-1.10) 
DailyReturn  0.0656***
(2.67) 
0.0569** 
(2.20) 
0.0254 
(0.84) 
0.0134 
(0.87) 
FirmAge  0.0007 
(0.30) 
0.004 
(0.95) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.0027* 
(1.72) 
BigN  0.2133** 
(2.42) 
0.6580***
(4.30) 
0.2602** 
(2.03) 
0.0725 
(1.06) 
JSOX  0.6174***
(5.75) 
0.2550** 
(2.21) 
0.2911** 
(2.43) 
-0.0981 
(-1.65) 
Intercept  -0.9476* (-1.96) 
-0.8512 
(-1.54) 
-0.4921 
(-0.89) 
-0.0845 
(-0.31) 
      
Clustered Client Firm 
Fixed-Effect Industry 
N 180 (60 * 3) 
Adj. R-squared  0.8575 0.6647 0.5422 0.2902 
The dependent variables are LnAFee, LnStaff, LnLiStaff and LnPartner as indicated in the table. 
Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.  
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Table 4 – Results for Analysis Controlling for Direct Audit Labor Variables 
 
  LnAFee
  Coefficient t-statistic 
    
PreRS  -0.1301*** -2.70 
PostRS  -0.0663 -1.37 
LnStaff  0.0856 1.25 
LnLiStaff  0.1360* 1.88 
LnPartner  0.2564 1.47 
LNAsset  0.2462*** 3.73 
Leverage  0.3082 1.27 
ROA  -0.0115 -0.05 
OverseaSales  -0.0019 -0.01 
LNSeg  -0.1100* -1.86 
LNSubs  0.2516*** 3.25 
DailyReturn  0.0539** 2.33 
FirmAge  -0.0003 -0.15 
BigN  0.1029 1.04 
JSOX  0.5811*** 4.88 
Intercept  -0.7862 -1.57 
    
Clustered  Client Firm 
Fixed-Effect  Industry 
N  180 (60 * 3) 
Adj. R-squared  0.8687 
The dependent variable is LnAFee. Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
    
    
 
 
 
   
23 
 
Table 5 – Results for Restatement after Controlling for Auditor Switch 
Panel A. Results for Deleting all Auditor Switching Observations  
 
  LnAFee LnStaff LnLiStaff LnPartner
      
PreRS  -0.1328** (-2.41) 
-0.0610 
(-0.82) 
-0.1207** 
(-2.14) 
-0.0422 
(-1.26) 
PostRS  -0.0384 (-0.80) 
-0.0660 
(-0.89) 
-0.0611 
(-1.13) 
0.0339 
(1.14) 
LnAsset  0.3147***
(5.27) 
0.1251* 
(1.94) 
0.2103*** 
(4.22) 
0.0790**
(2.67) 
Leverage  0.2201 
(0.66) 
0.3638 
(0.75) 
-0.0034 
(-0.01) 
-0.0416 
(-0.24) 
ROA  -0.3748 
(-1.56) 
0.2313 
(0.47) 
-0.1302 
(-0.48) 
-0.5135**
(-2.38) 
OverseaSales  -0.2399 
(-0.84) 
1.1194** 
(2.13) 
-0.6366 
(-1.24) 
-0.1029 
(-0.46) 
LnSeg  -0.0446 
(-0.80) 
-0.1109 
(-1.21) 
0.1054* 
(1.82) 
0.0208 
(0.48) 
LnSub  0.2687***
(3.43) 
0.0306 
(0.29) 
0.0036 
(0.04) 
-0.0597 
(-1.22) 
DailyReturn  0.0731***
(2.85) 
0.0756** 
(2.68) 
0.0387 
(1.31) 
0.0257* 
(1.74) 
FirmAge  0.0007 
(0.25) 
0.0066 
(1.30) 
-0.0004 
(-0.11) 
0.002 
(1.24) 
BigN  0.1432 
(1.43) 
0.7085***
(4.22) 
0.2515** 
(2.47) 
0.0475 
(0.57) 
JSOX  0.6194***
(5.56) 
0.2547* 
(1.81) 
0.2097* 
(1.84) 
-0.1035* 
(-1.72) 
Intercept  -0.9138* (-1.72) 
-0.2874 
(-0.36) 
-0.5462 
(-1.13) 
0.2788 
(0.69) 
      
Clustered Firm 
Fixed-Effect Industry 
N 147 (49 * 3) 
Adj. R-squared  0.8801 0.6835 0.6503 0.3497 
The dependent variables are LnAFee, LnStaff, LnLiStaff and LnPartner as indicated in the table. 
Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 5 – Results for Restatement after Controlling for Auditor Switch 
Panel B. Results for Deleting Auditor Switching between BigN and Non-BigN  
 
  LnAFee LnStaff LnLiStaff LnPartner 
      
PreRS  -0.1622*** (-3.12) 
-0.0740 
(-1.05) 
-0.1458*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.0580* 
(-1.85) 
PostRS  -0.0585 (-1.17) 
-0.0725 
(-1.09) 
-0.0786 
(-1.54) 
0.0547* 
(1.77) 
LnAsset  0.3098*** 
(5.39) 
0.1391** 
(2.28) 
0.2069*** 
(4.17) 
0.0756** 
(2.55) 
Leverage  0.2765 
(1.01) 
0.2097 
(0.59) 
0.1002 
(0.37) 
-0.0703 
(-0.41) 
ROA  -0.1195 
(-0.39) 
0.1508 
(0.45) 
0.1101 
(0.44) 
-0.3993** 
(-2.27) 
OverseaSales  -0.1453 
(-0.51) 
0.8009* 
(1.68) 
-0.3734 
(-0.92) 
-0.0137 
(-0.07) 
LnSeg  -0.0767 
(-1.13) 
-0.1398* 
(-1.80) 
0.1147** 
(2.10) 
0.0164 
(0.40) 
LnSub  0.2663*** 
(3.61) 
0.0446 
(0.48) 
0.0279 
(0.37) 
-0.0536 
(-1.13) 
DailyReturn  0.0679*** 
(2.67) 
0.0659** 
(2.42) 
0.0341 
(1.15) 
0.0237 
(1.65) 
FirmAge  0.0012 
(0.51) 
0.0042 
(1.00) 
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
0.0029* 
(1.85) 
BigN  0.1752* 
(1.74) 
0.7198*** 
(4.43) 
0.2516** 
(2.42) 
0.0555 
(0.68) 
JSOX  0.5771*** 
(5.49) 
0.2448** 
(2.06) 
0.152 
(1.38) 
-0.1293** 
(-2.22) 
Intercept  -1.0985** (-2.61) 
-0.8178 
(-1.48) 
-0.5658 
(-1.13) 
-0.2030 
(-0.74) 
      
Clustered Firm 
Fixed-Effect Industry 
N 165 (55 * 3) 
Adj. R-squared  0.8622 0.6392 0.6400 0.3158 
The dependent variables are LnAFee, LnStaff, LnLiStaff and LnPartner as indicated in the table. 
Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 – Results for using Misstatement Sample as a Placebo Test  
 
  LnAFee LnStaff LnLiStaff LnPartner
      
PreMS  -0.1663 (-0.79) 
-0.2233 
(-0.39) 
-0.3015 
(-0.94) 
-0.2287 
(-1.35) 
PostMS  0.3128 (1.47) 
-0.0259 
(-0.10) 
-0.1351 
(-0.51) 
-0.018 
(-0.10) 
LnAsset  0.0386 
(0.18) 
-0.6664 
(-1.25) 
-0.1543 
(-0.48) 
-0.1526 
(-1.00) 
Leverage  -2.6011 
(-1.61) 
0.4627 
(0.23) 
0.4396 
(0.20) 
-1.1025 
(-1.04) 
ROA  -1.4285 
(-1.23) 
0.7207 
(0.16) 
2.4996 
(1.48) 
1.4523 
(0.85) 
OverseaSales  -4.6879 
(-1.08) 
-0.7626 
(-0.16) 
9.1151* 
(2.13) 
0.7600 
(0.39) 
LnSeg  -0.0603 
(-0.66) 
0.0149 
(0.08) 
-0.3084*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.0248 
(-0.24) 
LnSub  -0.1083 
(-0.14) 
-0.9569 
(-0.74) 
-0.2285 
(-0.30) 
-0.2325 
(-0.68) 
DailyReturn  0.0236 
(0.25) 
0.114 
(0.57) 
0.0484 
(0.30) 
-0.0440 
(-0.60) 
FirmAge  -0.0289 
(-1.63) 
-0.015 
(-0.99) 
0.0168 
(1.75) 
0.0093 
(1.24) 
BigN  0.0289 
(0.15) 
0.4137 
(1.34 
-0.2653 
(-1.21) 
0.1345 
(0.46) 
JSOX  0.3192 
(0.63) 
0.2536 
(0.41) 
-0.0205 
(-0.05) 
-0.0609 
(-0.42) 
Intercept  6.3982* (2.24) 
11.9202 
(1.45) 
2.6077 
(0.39) 
2.7401 
(1.20) 
      
Clustered Firm 
Fixed-Effect Industry 
N 27 (9 * 3) 
Adj. R-squared  0.9242 0.6674 0.8714 0.2543 
The dependent variables are LnAFee, LnStaff, LnLiStaff and LnPartner as indicated in the table. 
Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 – Additional Robust Tests  
Panel A. Results for Placebo Tests with Non-Restatement Firm Sample 
 
  LnAFee LnStaff LnLiStaff LnPartner 
      
PreRS  0.0278 (0.72) 
-0.0612 
(-0.88) 
0.0150 
(0.27) 
0.0086 
(0.33) 
PostRS  -0.0028 (-0.06) 
-0.0179 
(-0.24) 
-0.0028 
(-0.05) 
0.0253 
(1.17) 
LnAsset  0.2950***
(5.82) 
0.2002**
(2.34) 
0.0592 
(1.35) 
0.0255 
(1.52) 
Leverage  0.0235 
(0.10) 
-0.077 
(-0.24) 
0.4944** 
(2.30) 
-0.0329 
(-0.40) 
ROA  -0.1455 
(-0.36) 
-0.8945 
(-1.37) 
0.8844* 
(2.00) 
0.1823*
(1.78) 
OverseaSales  -0.0822 
(0.35) 
-0.5127 
(-1.51) 
-0.4563* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0698 
(-0.71) 
LnSeg  0.1115** 
(2.35) 
-0.0254 
(-0.31) 
-0.0038 
(-0.06) 
0.0314*
(1.73) 
LnSub  0.1849** 
(2.57) 
0.0869 
(0.71) 
0.2698*** 
(3.72) 
0.0477 
(1.62) 
DailyReturn  0.0454* 
(1.94) 
0.0688 
(1.33) 
0.0310 
(1.53) 
0.0071 
(0.64) 
FirmAge  0.0008 
(0.41) 
0.0062 
(1.45) 
-0.0029 
(-1.38) 
-0.0003 
(-0.43) 
BigN  0.5582***
(3.92) 
0.7077**
(2.37) 
0.0721 
(0.61) 
0.0519 
(1.03) 
JSOX  0.3903***
(4.01) 
0.149 
(1.01) 
0.2395** 
(2.16) 
-0.0174 
(-0.42) 
Intercept  -1.1554** (-2.36) 
-1.7983**
(-2.56) 
-0.0020 
(-0.01) 
0.1826 
(1.16) 
      
Clustered Firm 
Fixed-Effect Industry 
N 180 (60 * 3 ) 
Adj. R-squared  0.8585 0.4880 0.5636 0.3966 
The dependent variables are LnAFee, LnStaff, LnLiStaff and LnPartner as indicated in the table. 
Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Panel B. Results for Placebo Tests with Non-Restatement Firm Sample Controlling 
for Direct Audit Labor Variables 
    
  LnAFee
  Coefficient t-statistic 
    
PreRS  0.0344 0.91 
PostRS  -0.0056 -0.12 
LnStaff  0.1498** 2.59 
LnLiStaff  0.0451 0.57 
LnAuditor  0.2191 1.40 
LnAsset  0.2567*** 5.54 
Leverage  0.0199 0.09 
ROA  -0.0914 -0.22 
OverseaSales  0.0304 0.14 
LnSeg  0.1086** 2.57 
LnSub  0.1493** 2.26 
DailyReturn  0.0322 1.45 
FirmAge  0.0001 0.05 
BigN  0.4376*** 3.60 
JSOX  0.3611*** 3.85 
Intercept  -0.9260** -2.09 
    
Clustered  Firm 
Fixed-Effect  Industry 
N  180 (60 * 3) 
Adj. R-squared  0.8685 
The dependent variable is LnAFee. Variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. The t-stats are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
   
    
 
 
 
 
